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[The author, Lucien Chavin, is a staff writer with Latinamerica Press, a weekly bilingual publication
in Lima, Peru.]
With the attention of Peru's security forces focused on the ongoing hostage crisis at the Japanese
ambassador's residence, the country's other guerrilla group, Sendero Luminoso, is slowly trying
to rebuild its shattered organization. Sendero which is much more violent than the Movimiento
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA), whose guerrillas have been holding 72 hostages in Japanese
Ambassador Morihisa Aoki's residence since Dec. 17 has been waging a bloody war against the state
since 1980.
During most of its 17-year struggle, Sendero, known officially as the Partido Comunista Peruano,
has targeted mainly campesino leaders, leftist elected officials and community leaders, and religious
workers, as well as police officers and soldiers. Central government representatives and military
officers were never high on the group's list of targets. The idea, according to Sendero, was to
liquidate those sectors that "cushioned" the state's policies. The 1992 assassination of Maria Elena
Moyano, the vice mayor of the Lima district of Villa El Salvador and an important grassroots
women's leader, fit this strategy.
At the time, Sendero justified Moyano's death, saying that she trafficked in food aid to keep the
people oppressed. Sendero actions take large human and material toll Sendero's campaign to
destroy the Peruvian state reached its height in mid-1992 when Lima was rocked almost daily by
car bombs planted by the group. Sendero blew up televisions stations, municipal offices, schools,
office buildings, and even a residential apartment building, killing more than 30 civilians while they
were sleeping. Sendero is blamed for the majority of the more than 30,000 deaths caused by political
violence in Peru in the 1980s and 1990s.
In addition, its strategy of calling "armed strikes" and destroying factories and high-tension
electric towers is responsible for the bulk of the more than US$20 billion in economic losses
caused by political violence. The group's claim that it had reached "strategic equilibrium" in 1991
ended almost as quickly as it began with the capture of nearly all the members of its politburo in
September 1992. Among those captured was Abimael Guzman, Sendero's once-mythic leader who
had managed to avoid arrest since going underground in 1979 to prepare for the war against the
state (see NotiSur, 09/22/92, 10/06/92, 10/13/92).
Guzman was easily broken by the police once in jail. Serving a life sentence in a windowless cell at a
navy base in Lima, Guzman in statements released by the government has called on his followers to
reach a "peace agreement" with the government. In a video of Guzman with several other members
of the politburo, he demands that his followers lay down their weapons. Guzman's capture and
his quick capitulation to the state he has called President Alberto Fujimori one of Peru's greatest
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leaders was too much for most of his followers who began turning themselves in or, as they say,
going into "deep underground" while they wait for their leader to say something else. Breakaway
faction emerges following Guzman's arrest Nevertheless, a breakaway faction of Sendero, known as
Sendero Rojo, has refused to lay down its weapons, saying that Guzman's surrender in prison is a
ploy. This faction, led by Oscar Ramirez Durand, known as "Feliciano," has kept a low profile since
Guzman's capture, but Sendero experts say that it is far from dormant or defeated.
In addition, they say that the MRTA siege of Aoki's residence, which gained that group worldwide
attention (see NotiSur, 01/10/97, 01/31/97 and 02/21/97), is important to Sendero for several reasons.
David Scott Palmer, a professor of international relations at Boston University and a Sendero expert
who taught with Guzman at the San Cristobal University where Sendero got its start, says that,
although Sendero is not nearly as strong as it was several years ago, it is trying to rebuild its base.
"My assumption is that Shining Path is taking advantage of the MRTA action to improve its own
situation," says Palmer. "Similar to past situations, it is using the circumstances to improve its
standing."
Currently, the country's intelligence agency (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional, SIN) and the antiterrorist force (Direccion Nacional Contra el Terrorismo, DINCOTE) are primarily occupied with
trying to figure out how the MRTA an organization DINCOTE said was dead in March 1996 when
it deactivated its MRTA desk pulled off the embassy takeover. With SIN and DINCOTE attention
focused elsewhere, Sendero has been carrying out daily actions in the northern jungle and central
highlands, two areas where it continues to exercise some level of control. In the most recent Sendero
attack on Feb. 24 in the small community of Crisnejas, in the department of Huanuco, 350 km north
of Lima, a Sendero column destroyed a local health clinic in the town. In a Dec. 27 attack on the
campesino community of Abra de Porculla, in the northern department of Piura, Sendero killed six
campesinos in typically violent style, beating them to death with clubs and stones.
The following day, Sendero killed four campesinos in Huanuco in the same way. Both Palmer and
Gustavo Gorriti, a leading Sendero scholar and currently associate editor of the Panamanian daily
La Prensa, say that Sendero Rojo must be seething when local and international press refer to the
MRTA as the country's leading guerrilla group, mentioning Sendero only as the country's "other"
guerrillas. "There is a great deal of hate between the two organizations," says Gorriti. "They have
different ideologies and ways of operating and organizing. With the taking of the ambassador's
residence, the MRTA believes it now has a more solid position over Sendero, which Sendero must
not like at all." Before the leaderships of Sendero and the MRTA were arrested MRTA's leader
Victor Polay was captured in July 1992 and is imprisoned at the same base as Guzman the two
groups regularly attacked each other, particularly in the central jungle where drug trafficking in
rampant.
During the early days of the hostage crisis, the MRTA took pains to distance itself from Sendero.
When the third and largest group of hostages was released on Dec. 20, the MRTA had one of the
hostages read a communique that included a point differentiating the MRTA from Sendero, which
it said is against the Peruvian people. Sendero tries to rebuild Nevertheless, Palmer says that, while
the MRTA believes it has gained the upper hand in its battle with Sendero, Sendero has been much
better at trying to rebuild after the fall of its leaders. "It (Sendero) has done what MRTA has never
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been able to do, which is try to reorganize at the grassroots level," says Palmer. "It is trying to regain
operational structure, something MRTA cannot do." Because Sendero is not carrying out violent
actions in Lima, analysts are concerned that the general population will lose sight of the violence
this group is capable of unleashing.
In the early years of the internal conflict, Sendero confined its actions to highland areas, which
gave residents in the capital a false sense that the war was far off and would never touch them.
This changed in the early 1990s, and most people were caught off guard by the coordinated way in
which Sendero was able to operate. "I don't find it surprising that they are not operating in Lima,"
says Palmer. "It is quite clear that they've returned to a defensive posture, which is consistent with
moving back to the countryside and returning to their actions of the past." Gorriti agreed. "Because
Shining Path is not carrying out attacks in Lima does not mean it is not active," he said. "It is trying
to rebuild and recruit new members. Any action would attract attention to this and jeopardize its
future plans."
Although Sendero has been relatively quiet in Lima, it has certainly not completely stopped carrying
out actions. In November 1996, the last month in which official statistics were released, Sendero
carried out actions albeit minor in 13 of Lima's 43 districts. In Villa El Salvador, where Maria Elena
Moyano was killed five years ago, a district employee, who asked not to be named, said that he
believes Sendero is once again trying to make headway in the district. He said that the strategy is
much more subtle than in the past and includes, in some cases, lending money to people interest
free and then slowly incorporating them into the group.
Villa El Salvador Mayor Michel Azcueta, who survived a Sendero attack in 1993 that left him with a
marked limp, says that Sendero has never been able to fully penetrate Villa, but it has not stopped
trying. Since the MRTA siege began in December, Peru's National Police have increased Azcueta's
police guard from two officers to five. Regardless of their actions even spectacular attacks such
as the MRTA's embassy siege both groups are pale images of what they were in the early 1990s.
Intelligence sources calculate that MRTA has only about 500 supporters nationwide and Sendero has
probably less than 2,000 people they can count on for support. Combatants are even fewer, probably
numbering less than 1,000. But even in their weakened state, both groups will be capable of carrying
out terrorists actions for years to come.

-- End --
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